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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Appellant agrees with Respondent that the cross-appeal need only be addressed if the 
Court reverses the order granting summary judgment in favor of Spudnik Equipment 
("Spudnik"). 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant relies on the statement of facts and course of proceedings set out m its 
Appellant's Brief. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent's characterization of the Appellant's issues on appeal 1s needlessly 
argumentative and misleading because it presupposes that Appellant did not raise a material 
issue of fact, when that is one of the issues raised on appeal. 
Spudnik's statement of the third issue is also misleading by assuming certain issues that 
first must be addressed by this Court. As the Cross-Respondent, Liberty Northwest Insurance Co. 
("Liberty Northwest") restates Spudnik's third issue on appeal as: 
III. (a) Is the doctrine of spoliation relevant to a defective design case; and, (b) if so, 
does the doctrine of spoliation extend to a party that does not have control or 
possession over particular evidence; and, ( c) if so, should the doctrine be 
expanded to allow dismissal of such party's cause( s) of action; and, ( d) if so, 
should dismissal be permitted without showing that the alleged spoliation was 
in ten ti on al? 
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III. ARGUMENT AS TO SPUDNIK'S RESPONSE. 
A. LIBERTY PRODUCED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE PRODUCT LIABILITY 
CLAIMS. 
1. The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That The Equipment \Vas .Manufactured bv 
Spudnik. 
Spudnik argues that "[t]here is no evidence provmg that Spudnik Equipment 
manufactured the 'conveyor system' involved in the accident." Brief of Respondent/Cross-
Appellant, p. 30. Actually, the record is quite clear that the equipment was manufactured by 
Spudnik. Mr. Olmos' direct supervisor, Gerardo Saucedo, specifically testified that the 
conveyors were Spudnik conveyors, to-wit: 
Q. Gerardo, the other-the conveyors that were being used 
that day, were they Spudnik conveyors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There weren't any L&L conveyors there that day? 
A. No. 
R. 363-64 (Saucedo Depo., p. 32, L. 21 - p. 33). Duane Grant, the owner of Grant 4-D Farms 
where Mr. Olmos was employed, testified that in 2008 the Farm kept its Spudnik conveyors 
"isolated" from its L&L manufactured conveyors because the two brands could not be easily 
hooked together, and were only used together in the event of "emergencies." R. 478 (Grant 
Depo., p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 15). He further stated that: "My recollection is the conveyor 
system that was being used in this case was all Spudnik." R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 66, LL 18-19). 
See also R. 191 (investigator identified the conveyor tables as manufactured by Spudnik and 
APPELLANT'S REPLY/CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2 
purchased at a farm action in March 2005 from the farm of Young & Young). The invoices for 
the conveyors show that they were sold by Spudnik to Grant 4-D Farms. R. 348-349 and 
Augmented Record. See also R. 210 (Miller Depo., p. 13, L. 23-24; p. 15, L. 16 - p. 16, L. 6) 
and R. 212 (Miller Depo., p. 23, LL 15-18) (testifying that conveyors were bought through 
Dennis Schumacher, Grant Farms contact at Spudnik). Notwithstanding taking depositions from 
six (6) witnesses and Liberty's expert, Dr. Gill, see R. 3 5, Spudnik did not find or introduce 
any evidence to the contrary. There is no question but that the conveyor system was 
manufactured by Spudnik. 
Spudnik suggests that because Liberty cannot "identify" all of the conveyors involved by 
their serial number, this makes it impossible to conclude that the conveyors were manufactured 
by Spudnik. Spudnik has not referenced any Idaho case law requiring this level of specificity. 
Other courts have not required serial numbers before acknowledging that a product was 
manufactured by a particular company. See, e.g., Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 956 
(Mass. 1978) (allowing identification of the manufacturer by the logo); Lenharr v. NRM Corp., 
504 F .Supp. 165 (D. Kansas 1980) (identity of manufacturer established by circumstantial 
evidence); Jacques v. Montana Nat'/ Guard, 649 P .2d 1319, 1323-24 (Mont. 1982) (same). r;;_:L_ 
Kesler v. Joe Hornstein, Inc., 207 A.D.2d 278, 279, 615 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (1994) (testimony 
of third party witness sufficient to prove that defendant did not manufacture defective projection 
bulb). Certainly, this is not a case where no one could identify the manufacturer. See, e.g. 
Schmidt v. Archer Iron Works, Inc., 256 N.E.2d 6, 8 (Ill. 1970) (plaintiff could not identify 
manufacturer of defective pin); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 967 
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(Pa. Super. 1985) (plaintiff could not identify what product-a tire or rim-failed or which of 
several possible manufacturers manufactured the rims). 
In this case, two third-party witnesses-including the work supervisor present at the time 
of the incident-testified that the equipment was manufactured by Spudnik. The uncontroverted 
evidence is that the equipment was purchased from Spudnik. Spudnik has offered nothing to 
refute this testimony. Consequently, the uncontroverted evidence is that Spudnik was the 
manufacturer and seller of the equipment that caused Mr. Olmos' injury. 
2. The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That The Equipment Was Defectively 
Designed. 
Spudnik contends that Liberty cannot identify evidence that the conveyor system was 
defective, arguing that evidence of a defect can only be established by examining all pieces of 
equipment in use at the time of the incident. 1 (Spudnik again ignores the fact that one of the 
conveyor tables was identified by serial number, and that there were only a limited number of 
tables that could have been involved in this incident, any and all of which Spudnik could have 
inspected if it had chosen to do so). R. 113-116. 
Spudnik's argument might make sense if the defect was based on something breaking or 
not functioning as intended-i.e., a mechanical or manufacturing defect. However, that is not the 
issue here. Rather, the issue is that the equipment lacked guards or other devices to protect 
against a farm worker, such as Mr. Olmos, getting his hand pulled into the junction between two 
1 Liberty objects to Spudnik's argument to the extent that Spudnik is arguing that Dr. Gill's 
testimony was somehow inadmissible. This was not an issue raised before the District Court, and 
Spudnik cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 201, 192 
P.3d 1021, 1025 (2008). 
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conveyors, or adequately warning of the danger. See generally R. 384, 391-92. These are issues 
common to all conveyor tables manufactured by Spudnik, not just the two that actually crushed 
Mr. Olmos' hand. 
The absence of guards or other protective devices or adequate warnmgs is not 
"hypothetical," as Spudnik argues. Dr. Gill reviewed video, photographs, and Spudnik's own 
documentation on the conveyors, which more than adequately demonstrated the absence of the 
guards and warnings. See R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LL 10-12). C.{, Rodgers v. Shave Mfg. Co. 
Inc., 993 F.Supp. 1428, 1433 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (admitting expert testimony on defective design 
of post-hole digger where expert had inspected photographs, pleadings, affidavits and 
depositions); Thomas v. Perry Mfg., Inc., 539 So.2d 2 (Fla. App. 1989) (allowing defective 
design case to proceed against the manufacturer of a scaffold, although the scaffold was missing, 
because the plaintiff's expert had been able to examine photographs taken of the scaffold shortly 
after the accident as well as the manufacturer's specifications). Duane Grant also testified that 
Spudnik's equipment did not come with guards. R. 478 (Grant Depo. P. 64, LL 23-25). Spudnik 
did not offer any evidence that it had manufactured its conveyors with guards or other protective 
devices, or the necessary warnings. 
Spudnik references testimony from Mr. Miller purporting to state that the machinery was 
not defective. Mr. Miller was not present at the time of the accident. R. 213 (Miller Depo., p. 39, 
LI. 7-8). There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Miller is qualified to provide an 
expert opinion on whether the equipment was defective. Nevertheless, a review of Mr. Miller's 
testimony shows that he was discussing a mechanical malfunction. 
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Q. BY MR. BOWER: Do you believe the conveyor was 
defective? 
A No. 
MR. PAPPAS: Object to the extent the term "defective" is vague. 
Q. BY MR. BOWER: What's your understanding of the term 
"defective"? 
A Yeah. I don't know. If it operated properly, it would not be 
defective. 
R. 213 (Miller Depo., p. 39, L. 19 p. 40, L. 2). That Grant Farms believed that the equipment 
was defective-at least as to the absence of guards-is demonstrated by the fact that, after Mr. 
Olmos injury and a second, similar accident, the Farm subsequently devised and installed its own 
"shielding mechanism that we believe will make it more difficult to gain access to the junction 
between the two conveyors." R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 64, LL 5-7 and 15-19). 
Spudnik's contention is also not supported by the decisions in other jurisdictions. In 
Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota 1Wotor Corp., 937 F.Supp. 134 (D. Puerto Rico 1996), the court 
rejected a motion for dismissal for spoliation based on contentions similar to those raised by 
Spudnik, reasoning: 
TMC has filed a motion to dismiss, based on the contention that 
the plaintiffs intentional or merely negligent spoliation of the 
evidence deprived TMC of an adequate opportunity to defend 
itself. TMC's motion might have been successful if the plaintiffs 
claim were based on a defect in manufacturing, for such a claim 
would require an inspection and evaluation of the specific item that 
caused the injury. Instead, in the case at hand, the plaintiffs claim 
is based on an alleged design defect, which, by definition, would 
be found in the entire production run of the vehicle model in 
question. The proof or refutation of such a claim may be 
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sufficiently supported with evidence as to other, identical vehicles. 
Id. at 136 (italics in original). Similarly, in Donohoe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 
F.R.D. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1994), the court held that examination and disassembly of a seatbelt 
mechanism did not constitute spoliation of evidence, but further noted that "Plaintiffs theory of 
recovery by itself significantly lessens the importance of the Donohoe belt. Since she is 
proceeding on a theory of design defect only, any other belt of the same model will possess the 
same inherent defect and can be tested and examined for defects in the same manner as the 
N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (2006) (allowing defective design case to proceed, even though product had 
been lost, because the plaintiffs expert had examined exemplar); Schroader v. Dept. of 
Transportation, 710 A.2d 23, 28 (Penn. 1998) (rejecting spoliation argument where defective 
vehicle had been sold, reasoning that because the claim was based "upon a design defect 
common to all trucks of its kind," the defendant could "comparably test and examine other trucks 
for the alleged design defect."); Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79-80 (3rd 
Cir. 1994) (reversing judgment as a matter oflaw for "spoliation" because the case represented a 
design defect case). 
In short, Dr. Gill detailed the shortcomings in the design, including the lack of physical 
guards, and warnings provided with the conveyor tables. These were plain from the video, 
photographs, manufacturer's manuals, and other evidence considered by Dr. Gill. Mr. Grant's 
testimony is unequivocal that Spudnik conveyors did not have guards installed. Spudnik never 
offered any testimony that the equipment was manufactured or sold to Grant Fanns with the 
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safety features or warnings that Dr. Gill stated were missing. Accordingly, the District Court 
should have denied Spudnik's motion for summary judgment and, instead, granted summary 
judgment to Liberty. 
3. The Evidence Shows That The Defects Were Present When Sold By Spudnik. 
The uncontroverted testimony is that conveyors were defectively designed and lacked 
adequate warnings. Dr. Gill testified that the hazard was caused by the "nip point"-the close 
proximity of two turning belts. R. 384-85 (Gill Depa., p. 39, L. 7 - p. 40, L. 7). He noted that it 
is not an open and obvious hazard. R. 386 (Gill Depo., p. 44, LL 5-18; p. 45, LL 22-25) and 387-
88 (Gill Depo., p. 51, L. 23 - p. 52, L. 4). Dr. Gill determined, however, that the equipment was 
defective because it did not protect against inadvertent contact with the belts at the nip point. R. 
388 (Gill Depo., p. 55, LL 7-14). Dr. Gill noted several design features that might have 
eliminated or mitigated the defect, including use of a kill switch and guarding. R. 388-89 (Gill 
Depa., p. 53, L. 16 - p. 55, L. 6). See also R. 387 (Gill Depo., p. 48, L. 5 - p. 50, L. 17) 
(addressing other alternative designs). He also testified that the design of the conveyors violated 
industry standards on the use of guards and safety features for where conveyors are connected 
and joined. R. 391-92 (Gill Depo., p. 67, L. 20-p. 68, L. 11). 
These defects were present when the equipment was manufactured and sold by Spudnik. 
Dr. Gill testified that the nip point hazard "was created back in the design of this equipment and 
this was the hazard actually being realized in realtime [sic] was when the two conveyor[s] were 
counter-rotating coming into each other." R. 392 (Gill Depo., p. 392, LL 12-16). Mr. Grant, who 
was familiar with Spudnik's equipment, also testified that the Spudnik conveyors did not come 
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with guards, nor was he aware of Spudnik offering guards. R. 478 (Grant Depa. P. 64, Ll. 23-
25). 
Dr. Gill also testified that there were no labels or warnings of the nip point hazard, also in 
violation of industry standards. R. 384 (Gill Depa., p. 38, L. 1 - p. 39, L. 10) and R. 391 (p. 66, 
L. 19 - p. 67, L. 1 ). His knowledge was gained from the video of the equipment, the 
photographs, "and the Spudnik manual because the manual tells you what warning labels are on 
the equipment and there's none for that." R. 384 (Gill Depa., p. 38, LL 10-12). Dr. Gill also 
noted that manual does not discuss or warn about the nip point hazard, stating: 
I just looked at the manual and in general the manual is not very 
good from a safety perspective and one of the things that is 
particularly relevant here is they really don't alert you to this 
potential in-running nip point. Not only is it not in the safety 
section, it's not back where it should be in an imbedded warning 
and the manual tells you it's going to do that. In the safety section 
it says when things occur that are relevant for safe operation 
include your safety, health, and well-being we're going to put the 
safety alert symbol in the manual for you, the triangle with the 
exclamation point, but it's not there. 
R. 391 (Gill Depa., p. 67, LL 4-14). 
Spudnik complains that "there are no records regarding modifications, repairs or 
alterations made to the conveyors before or after they were purchased by Grant 4-D farms." This 
is nothing more than a red herring. Dr. Gill testified that "the condition of the equipment was not 
proximate" to the incident. R. 383-84 (Gill Depa., p. 35, L. 22 - p. 36, L. 16). Spudnik has not 
offered any expert testimony to explain why the condition of the equipment would have had an 
impact on Spudnik's decision years earlier to not include safety features or warnings. 
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Spudnik contends that Liberty is under a "faulty assumption [ ] that all Spudnik 
Equipment conveyors use three-phase electricity, that all Spudnik Equipment conveyors are 
wired the same, or that the conveyors involved in the accident even had the possibility of 
reversing directions at the time they left Spudnik Equipment's manufacturing facility." In 
actuality, it is Spudnik that asks the Court to engage in speculation. 
Spudnik thinks it is significant that conveyors can be purchased with different electrical 
connections and motors. However, the fact that someone could buy a conveyor with a single-
phase motor does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that Grant Farms had done so. Dr. Gill 
testified that the motors on the conveyors require a lot of torque and use high-voltage three-phase 
motors. R. 382 (Gill Depo., p. 31, LI. 10-15). Mr. Grant testified that the conveyors operated on 
three phase power. R. 469 (Grant Depo., p. 30, LI. 22-25). He explained at length about the 
three-phase power system and why a motor could turn one direction or another if the line of 
conveyor tables are shortened or extended. See R. 471-73 (Grant Depo. pp. 39-44). Mr. Grant 
also noted that it was a common problem and was common knowledge within the industry. R. 
473 (Grant Depo., p. 44, LL 19-23). See also R. 221 (Alvarez Depo., p. 66, L. 23 p. 67, L. 2) 
(noting the issue of starting up and turning a different direction); Spudnik has not pointed to any 
testimony in the record indicating that Grant Farms purchased the conveyors with single phase 
motors and later switched the subject conveyors from single-phase to three-phase motors. More 
importantly, Spudnik has not provided any evidence that the conveyor, as designed, could not 
switch direction when pulled out of the line or inserted into the line. 
Spudnik suggests that "[t]here is simply no way to tell whether the conveyors had been 
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reconfigured or rewired by a prior owner or even what the make-up of the conveyor system was 
on the day it left the control of Spudnik Equipment." Liberty disagrees. The record of sale of the 
conveyors is part of the record. R. 348-349 and Augmented Record. Spudnik could have 
reviewed the serial numbers and determined whether the conveyors were manufactured with 
single phase motors. Mr. Miller also testified that, prior to Grant Farms purchasing the 
conveyors, he had spoken with Spudnik's representative, Dennis Schumacher, about the 
condition of the equipment, and that Mr. Schumacher had described the general condition of the 
equipment and what he thought of them. Thus, Spudnik could have introduced testimony or 
records from Mr. Schumacher's inspection of the equipment. Finally, Spudnik could have 
introduced expert evidence that, absent modification, it would have been impossible for the 
motors to tum a different direction. It is significant that there is no such testimony or evidence. 
The record also indicates that any modifications made by Grant 4-G Farms were after Mr. 
Olmos' injury. The guards developed by the Farm were not installed until after a similar incident 
in 2010. R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 64, Ll. 5-19). The adapters to allow the Farm to use L&L 
conveyors with Spudnik conveyors, and different models of Spudnik conveyors together, where 
not installed until the winter of 2009. R. 475 (Grant Depo., p. 54, LL 1-4); R. 478 (Grant Depo., 
p. 65, LL 21-25). The phase reversers that the Farm eventually installed, to allow the direction of 
the motors to be changed, were not installed until the winter of 2009-over a year after Mr. 
Olmos' injury. See R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 66, LL 24-25). While some of the phase reversers 
(i.e., directional switches) were already installed when the Farm purchased the conveyors, Mr. 
Grant believed that the switches had been installed by Spudnik. See R. 475 (Grant Depo., p. 55, 
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LL 7-14). Mr. Grant testified that the Farm had modified the plugs on the conveyors so they are 
uniform, but the testimony does not indicate when the modifications took place. See R. 475 
(Grant Depo., p. 54, L. 17 - p. 55, L. 6). See also R. 191 (investigator's report indicating that 
there were no modifications to the conveyor table); R. 427 (Groat Depo., p. 44, L. 21 -p. 45, L. 
13). 
In short, the uncontroverted evidence is that the conveyors were defectively designed and 
lacked adequate warnings, which defects and omissions are what caused Mr. Olmos' injury. 
4. The Defects and Warnings Were the Proximate Cause of the Accident. 
Spudnik argues that Liberty cannot offer evidence of proximate cause because it cannot 
identify the particular conveyors and, therefore, cannot identify the particular defect that lead to 
the accident. Spudnik's argument is specious for two reasons. First, one of the conveyors 
involved was identified by serial number, and there were only a limited number of other possible 
conveyors that could have been involved. This is not an issue of an inability to examine the 
conveyors, it is an issue of a lack of effort by Spudnik to do so. 
Second, as discussed in much greater detail above, the defect alleged is a design defect 
and a lack of warnings. Dr. Gill testified at length and in detail of what types of safety features 
were absent from the conveyor, why they were important, and that their absence led to Mr. 
Olmos' injury. Spudnik had done nothing to refute this-it has not offered testimony that it 
designed and manufactured its products with any of the safety features recommended by Dr. Gill. 
In fact, the testimony is clear that there were no warnings on the machine or in the manual about 
a possible nip point hazard, nor any guards or other safety devices to prevent someone like Mr. 
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Olmos from getting their hand caught in the nip points. Consequently, given the unrefuted 
evidence, this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court, and remand with 
instructions that the District Court grant summary judgment to Liberty. 
5. Age and Disability Did Not Cause This Accident. 
Spudnik stoops to blaming Mr. Olmos' age and (alleged) disabilities for his accident.2 Dr. 
Gill testified that farm workers that were elderly and/or had disabilities were part of the 
foreseeable user group for this type of equipment. R. 379 (Gill Depo., p. 18, L. 15 - p. 19, L. 
19). Dr. Gill stated that why Mr. Olmos had his hand on or near the nip point was not relevant to 
his analysis that the equipment was defectively designed. R. 393 (Gill Depo., p. 72, LL 3-19). 
Dr. Gill further stated that "[i]n this case, [']is it foreseeable that someone's hands would be 
inside[?'] and the answer is not only is it foreseeable, that's the nature of the tasks they perform, 
is putting their hands inside the rails and on to the area where the conveyor belt is." R. 393 (Gill 
Depo., p. 73, LL 8-12). In short, it was foreseeable that older and/or disabled workers would be 
employed to pick clods and debris from the potatoes on the conveyor. Spudnik's argument is 
essentially a concession that the equipment was defective and unreasonable hazardous. 
Spudnik also returns to its mantra about "failing to preserve" the equipment that is still 
present and being used at Grant Farms. As explained above, it is irrelevant. As the designer and 
manufacturer, if Spudnik manufactured equipment with any of the safety features and warnings 
that Dr. Gill discussed, such as the guards that Grant Farms itself subsequently made and 
2 It is notable that George Olmos, Mr. Olmos' son, denied that Mr. Olmos had any mental 
problems, and disclaimed that it was a mistake for his father to work on the conveyor belts. R. 
249 (Olmos Depo., p. 42, LL 1-16) and R. 251 (Olmos Depo., p. 71, LL 12-15). 
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installed, Spudnik could have easily submitted such evidence. There is no evidence from an 
expert refuting any of Dr. Gill's conclusions. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FAILURE TO WARN. 
Spudnik argues that the inability to identify the conveyors as dispositive to the issue 
whether Liberty can meet its burden as to the claim of a failure to warn. As discussed above, 
there is no doubt but that the conveyors involved were all manufactured by Spudnik. See R. 363-
64 (Saucedo Depo., p. 32, L. 21 - p. 33); R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 19). See 
also R. 191 (investigator identified the conveyor tables as manufactured by Spudnik and 
purchased at a farm action in March 2005 from the farm of Young & Young); R. 348-349 and 
Augmented Record.; R. 210 (Miller Depo., p. 13, L. 23-24; p. 15, L. 16 - p. 16, L. 6) and R. 
212 (Miller Depo., p. 23, LL 15-18). Dr. Gill reviewed photographs and videos of the conveyors 
and, because they list all of the warning labels on the machines, Spudnik's manuals. There were 
no warnings of a possible nip point hazard, either on the machines or discussed in the manual. R. 
384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LL 10-12); R. 391 (Gill Depo., p. 67, LL 4-14). Spudnik has not presented 
any evidence that the manual was incorrect, or its product actually shipped with warnings. Thus, 
the Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and remand with instructions that the 
District Court enter summary judgment for Liberty. 
C. WARRANTY CLAIMS. 
Liberty is not challenging the District Court's decision as to the warranty issues. 
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IV. LIBERTY'S RESPONSE TO SPUDNIK'S CROSS-APPEAL 
A. THERE WAS NO SPOLIATION BY LIBERTY. 
One of the basic flaws in Spudnik's argument is that Liberty did not destroy any of the 
evidence. "The doctrine of spoliation of evidence 'provides that when a party with a duty to 
preserve evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was 
unfavorable to that party." Ada County Highway Dist. V. Total Success lnvs., LLC, 145 Idaho 
360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008) (quoting Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824, 
87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003)). 
It is uncontroverted that the conveyors involved were owned by Grant 4 D Farms at the 
time of the incident. See R. 191; R. 348-349 and Augmented Record (invoices for conveyors). 
See also R. 210 (Miller Depo., p. 13, L. 23-24; p. 15, L. 16 - p. 16, L. 6) and R. 212 (Miller 
Depo., p. 23, LL 15-18) (testifying that Grant 4 D Farms had purchased the conveyors through 
Dennis Schumacher, Grant Farms contact at Spudnik). 
The incident and injury occurred on October 9, 2010 (i.e., a Thursday). R. 190. However, 
it was not reported to Liberty until the weekend. R. 442-433 (Groat Depo., p. 107, L. 25 -p. 108, 
L. 3 ). Mr. Groat, the Liberty investigator, received notice on October 13, 2010 (i.e., the 
following Monday). R. 426 (Groat Depo., p. 41, LL 11-12). Mr. Groat spoke to Mr. Grant on the 
13th to set up an appointment to conduct his investigation. At that time, Mr. Grant told Mr. Groat 
that the farm had continued to use the equipment. R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 32, L. 17 - p. 33, L. 
4), R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 106, LL 11-25; p. 107, L. 5-16). See also R. 470 (Grant Depo., p. 32, 
LL 8-11) (testifying that the farm continued to use the conveyors). 
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Because of prior appointments, Mr. Groat was unable to get to the farm until October 15, 
2008. R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 33, LL 5-9). Mr. Groat also returned on October 20, 2008, to 
conduct further investigation. R. 423 (Groat Depo., p. 30, LL 6-13; p. 31, LL 8-20). 
Mr. Groat noted that if there had been a machinery breakdown or malfunction, he 
normally would have requested the insured to "secure" the machinery. R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 
104, L. 8 105, L. 12). But Mr. Groat's understanding from Mr. Grant was that the accident 
was the result of a mishap, not a malfunction of the machinery; he treated the investigation as a 
worker's compensation injury; and Mr. Groat did not conclude from his investigation that there 
had been a malfunction or breakdown of the machinery. R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 106, LL 1-20; p. 
107, p. 8-10), R. 443 (Groat Depo., p. 109, L. 9- p. 110, L. 22). 
There were only 6 conveyor tables purchased. See R. 348-349 and Augmented Record 
(invoices for conveyors). One of the tables involved in the accident was specifically identified by 
its serial number. R. 191. There is no evidence or indication that any of the tables have been 
sold. 
In sum, Liberty did not possess or control the conveyor tables. The tables continued to be 
used, including being moved around, after Mr. Olmos' accident, even prior to Liberty being 
notified of the accident. Liberty's investigator did not believe that there was a mechanical 
breakdown or malfunction that would have prompted him to request that Grant Farms secure the 
equipment. The tables are still at the farm. 
Thus, the evidence is clear that Liberty was not the party that engaged in the spoliation, if 
any, of the evidence. Spoliation only applies to the party connected to the loss or destruction of 
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the evidence." Courtney, 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003). Moreover, similar to the 
situation in Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999), where the plaintiffs expert 
failed to examine a shotgun for evidence of mechanical defect, the conveyors are still at the farm. 
To paraphrase Bromley, "[t]he evidence necessary to show whether the [conveyor was defective] 
was available to [Spudnik]. The [conveyors were] not lost and [they were] not destroyed." 
Bromley, 132 Idaho at 812. Finally, there is no evidence that at the time of Mr. Groat's 
investigation, he was aware of the possibility of future litigation due to any alleged defects in the 
design or manufacture of the equipment. 
B. LIBERTY DID NOT INTENTIONALLY DESTROY ANY EVIDENCE. 
The doctrine of spoliation only applies where the party charged with destroying the 
evidence did so intentionally. Ada County Highway Dist. V. Total Success lnvs., LLC, 145 
Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008). Here, the District Court found no evidence of 
intentional conduct by Liberty in allegedly failing to preserve evidence. R. 302. Spudnik does 
not challenge the District Court's findings, nor does Spudnik offer any evidence of intentional 
spoliation by Liberty. Thus, Spudnik has waived any challenge to the District Court's findings. 
Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557-58, 130 P.3d 1087, 1095-96 (2006). 
C. SPUDNIK HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY ARGUMENT FOR EXTENSION 
OR MODIFICATION OF THE LAW. 
Spudnik, however, asks the court to adopt a negligence standard for spoliation, and 
extending the duty and/or sanction to third parties. Spudnik does not offer any argument as to 
why the Court should overrule its prior precedent on this matter. 
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This issue was previously raised to and rejected by this Court in Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, 
Inc., supra. In Courtney, the court noted that "[s]poliation is a rule of evidence applicable at the 
discretion of the trial court." Courtney, 139 Idaho at 824. It is a form of admission by conduct. 
Id. There, the plaintiff argued: (i) that the person destroying or losing the evidence has a duty to 
preserve the evidence and, therefore, his or her state of mind should have no bearing on the 
sanction for its loss; and (ii) the presumption should apply to all defendants, not just the 
defendant who lost or destroyed the evidence. Id. 
The court rejected the argument that the state of mind should be irrelevant because it was 
inconsistent with spoliation being a form of admission. The court, citing McCormick on 
Evidence, noted that "[b]y resorting to wrongful devices, the party is said to provide a basis for 
believing that he or she things the case is weak and not to be won by fair means .... " Courtney, 
139 Idaho at 824 (quoting McCormick on Evidence, 4th Ed. § 265, pp. 189-94 (1992)). 
Obviously, there is no admission by conduct if the conduct was inadvertent or negligent because 
"it does not sustain the inference of consciousness of a weak case." Id. The court in Courtney 
also rejected the argument that spoliation should apply to innocent third parties, noting that "[a]s 
an admission, the spoliation only applies to the party connected to the loss or destruction of the 
evidence." Courtney, 139 Idaho at 824. The court concluded: 
Whether or not conduct constitutes an admission depends upon the 
party's knowledge or intent that can be inferred from that conduct. 
For the loss or destruction of evidence to constitute an admission, 
the circumstances must indicate that the evidence was lost or 
destroyed because the party responsible for such loss or destruction 
did not want the evidence available for use by an adverse party in 
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The merely 
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negligence loss of evidence will not support the inference, nor 
would the intentional destruction of an item that a party had no 
reason to believe had any evidentiarv significance at the time it 
was destroyed. 
Courtney, 139 Idaho at 824 (underline added). 
The court also considered this issue in Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 796 
P .2d I 01 (1990), and rejected an argument calling for imposition of negligent spoliation of 
evidence. Murray, 118 Idaho at 229. 
Spudnik's references to Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) and 
Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equipment Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51P.3d392 (2002), are unavailing. In 
Bromley, the court clearly indicated that spoliation arose "when a party with a duty to preserve 
evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was 
unfavorable to that party." Bromley, 132 Idaho at 812 (underline added). The court also 
indicated that spoliation was a rule of evidence. Id. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent between 
Bromley and this Court's other cases discussing spoliation. 
In Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equipment Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51 P.3d 392 (2002), the 
court noted prior Idaho cases that had discussed the tort of spoliation of evidence, but that it had 
not been adopted in Idaho. Ricketts, 137 Idaho at 581-82. However, the court indicated that 
it was an intentional tort, closely aligned to the tort of intentional interference with a prospective 
business advantage. Id. In Ricketts, the court did not adopt the tort, but merely noted that there 
was no evidence of intent to support the claim. The Ricketts opinion cited to Cook v. State Dept. 
of Trans., 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150 (1999) and Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 
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Idaho 171, 923 P .2d 416 ( 1996). In Cook, the plaintiff has filed a suit that included a claim for 
spoliation of evidence against ITD, but had failed to file a notice of tort claim. Cook, 133 Idaho 
at 298. In Yoakum, the court, without adopting the tort, noted that the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate that the defendant had willfully destroyed any evidence. Yoakum, 129 Idaho at 178. 
In this case, Spudnik has not made a claim against Liberty for the tort of spoliation. See R. 27 et 
seq. 
In short, Spudnik has not presented any cogent argument for an extension or modification 
of Idaho law to allow a sanction, especially dismissal of a case, for negligent spoliation of 
evidence. None of the foregoing cases support Spudnik's argument. Consequently, the Court 
should deny Spudnik's request. 
D. EVEN IF THE COURT RECOGNIZED NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION, IT IS 
UNAVAILING IN THIS CASE. 
There is no evidence that Liberty had a duty to prevent spoliation, breached its duty, if 
any, or was the proximate cause of any prejudice to Spudnik. As noted above, the equipment was 
owned by Grant Farms, not Liberty. Moreover, Liberty was not involved in the decision for the 
Farm to continue to use the equipment following the accident-Liberty was not even notified for 
two or three days. 
There is also no evidence that Spudnik was prejudiced to any material degree. As noted 
above, other courts have held that spoliation is not appropriate in a defective design case because 
the parties can examine exemplars to determine if there was a problem in the design. Several of 
those cases were from jurisdictions that have adopted a negligent spoliation standard. 
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For instance, in Enstrom v. Garden Place Hotel, 27 A.D.3d 1084, 811 N.Y.S.2d 263, 
(2006), the court noted that under New York law, spoliation sanctions may be appropriate "even 
if the destruction occurred through negligence rather than willfulness, and even if the evidence 
was destroyed before the spoliator became a party, provided [the party] was on notice that the 
evidence might be needed for future litigation." Enstrom, 27 A.D.3d at 1086 (brackets in 
original). Nevertheless, the court found that the requested sanction of striking the pleading was 
unwarranted because the plaintiffs liability theory was based on defective design, and the 
plaintiffs expert had been able to examine an exemplar and determine that there had been a 
design defect. Id. 
In Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 93 7 F .Supp. 134 (D. Puerto Rico 1996), the 
court was requested to dismiss the plaintiffs pleading based on negligent spoliation. In that case, 
the plaintiff alleged a defective design of air bags in a motor vehicle, but the motor vehicle had 
been sold and the purchaser could not be located. Id. at 136. As discussed in more detail above, 
the court rejected the request because the claim was for a design defect that could be proven or 
disproven by examining other vehicles manufactured by the defendant. Id. 
Both Schroader v. Dept. of Transportation, 710 A.2d 23 (Penn. 1998) and Schmid v. 
~Yilwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 1994) held that the sanction for spoliation 
depended, in part, on the culpability of the party that destroyed the evidence and the resulting 
prejudice, suggesting that negligent spoliation would be considered an option. However, in both 
cases, the court rejected a call for judgment against the plaintiffs for alleged spoliation because 
the cases involved design defects that could be determined from an examination of the products. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY /CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 21 
Even more significantly, Spudnik has no expert testimony that explains why it has been 
prejudiced by the alleged spoliation. That is, Spudnik has not submitted expert testimony to 
explain why it needs to examine the original equipment rather than examine an exemplar or rely 
on its records or plans. 
In short, even if this Court were to consider a negligence standard for spoliation, there is 
no evidence of a duty or breach by Liberty. Certainly, there is no showing of culpability on the 
part of Liberty, or prejudice to Spudnik, that would justify dismissal of Liberty's claims. 
C. NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
EXTANT CASE LAW. 
In considering whether to modify or extend existing law, the court should be cognizant of 
its impact on other law. For instance, Idaho has long recognized that a plaintiff may prove a 
product's liability claim by circumstantial evidence of a malfunction of the product, recognizing 
that "evidence of a defect in a product which was present when it left the manufacturer's control 
will be rare and unusual." Farmer v. Int'! Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 747, 553 P.2d 1306, 
1311 (197 6). "In other words, if the plaintiff cannot prove that a specific defect cause the 
accident, it will suffice if it can be shown that the product malfunctioned, and that there are no 
other reasonably likely causes of the malfunction." Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 
227, 796 P.2d 101, 104 (1990). In both Henderson v. Cominco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 
518 P.2d 873 (1973) and Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107 Idaho 836, 693 P.2d 1038 
(1984), the court allowed circumstantial evidence of defectively manufactured farm chemicals, 
even though there is no indication in the cases that any of the chemical had been saved. 
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To follow Spudnik's argument would threaten this rule ofldaho law. Certainly, ifthere is 
reasonable circumstantial evidence of a defect, and there is expert testimony eliminating other 
causes or misuse of the product, an injured plaintiff should not have his or her case dismissed 
merely because the product is lost or destroyed through inadvertence on the part of the plaintiff 
or through no fault of the plaintiff. 
D. COSTS. 
Liberty asserts that it be awarded its costs of appeal as a matter of right should it be found 
to be the prevailing party. I.A.R. 40. Moreover, because Spudnik's cross-appeal is unreasonable 
in the face of established Idaho law, Liberty should be awarded its attorney's fees. First State 
Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 615, 130 P.3d 1146, 1153 (2006); I.C. § 12-121; 
I.R.C.P. 54(e); I.A.R. 11.2 and 41. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Liberty has properly presented admissible expert testimony and other 
testimony establishing that there was a design defect. Spudnik failed to respond with admissible 
expert testimony either to refute Liberty's expert or to show why it has been prejudiced by the 
alleged spoliation of evidence. The evidence also shows that there was no spoliation of the 
evidence; or, if there was any, it was not caused by Liberty. Consequently, the Court should 
reverse the summary judgment entered by the District Court, and remand this matter with 
instructions that summary judgment be entered in favor of Liberty. The Court should also award 
Liberty its costs and attorney's fees on Spudnik's cross-appeal. 
DATED this zy!~ay of December, 2012. 
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